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Turkish foreign policy after the ‘Arab Spring’: from agenda-
setter state to agenda-entrepreneur state
Burak Bilgehan O¨zpeka* and Yelda Demirag˘b
aDepartment of International Relations, TOBB University of Economics and Technology,
Ankara, Turkey; bDepartment of Political Science and International Relations, Baskent
University, Ankara, Turkey
This article explores Turkey’s changing foreign policy approach towards the
Middle East after the spread of the Arab upheavals to Syria. Instead of
preserving the status quo, Ankara has turned to a revisionist state that has
begun to threaten Middle Eastern governments. While Turkey was reluctant
to join the foreign military interventions against Middle Eastern regimes,
(e.g. Libya) it has been instrumental in immersing NATO in the Syrian civil
war. Such transformation ultimately undermines analyses that define Turkey
as the kingmaker of the Middle East.
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The popularity of Turkey and Erdogan within the Arab world has already allowed
the AKP (Justice and Development Party) to turn traditional Turkish foreign policy
on its head by drawing strength from its common heritage and history with its
Middle Eastern neighbors rather than being a handicap. Turkish foreign policy
under the AKP has come to articulate a vision for improving relations with all its
neighbours, particularly by privileging its former Ottoman space in the Middle East,
such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria where agreements are being
negotiated for a free-trade zone and an eventual Middle Eastern Union. The
growing economic and political engagement of Turkey with the Middle East has
already led to a significant realignment in the region.1
Thus wrote Joshua Walker on 3 February 2011 in Foreign Policy. This article
portrayed Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an as the kingmaker of the
Middle East due to his support for the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions,
highlighting Turkish domestic approval of this support with an image of Turkish
protestors holding anti-Mubarak banners.
Until the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria in February 2011, Walker and like-
minded scholars were justified in believing that there was a causal connection
between Turkey’s new foreign policy behaviour, which deviates significantly
from the traditional and non-involvement-based understanding of the Turkish
Republic’s foreign policy, and the major political changes in the Middle East.
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Indeed, after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Paritsi –
AKP) government was formed in 2002, Turkey’s activism towards the Middle
East region had already been gaining significant momentum. During this
period, Turkey established extensive trade relations with Middle Eastern
countries, attempted to moderate the nuclear crisis between Iran and the West,
mediated peace talks between Israel and Syria, signed oil and natural gas
pipeline projects, and engaged in Iraq’s domestic political competition, the
Israel–Palestine quagmire and the Arab awakenings. In essence, Turkey has
actively promoted its economic relations with Middle Eastern countries and
aimed to play a politically determinative role in the Middle East without using
instruments of hard power.2
However, this picture changed dramatically after the ‘Arab Spring’ spread
to Syria and threatened the Ba’athist regime of Bashar Assad. Turkey’s Middle
East policy, which has opposed the militarization of the region during the AKP
governments, has been replaced by a new agenda based on military solutions.
Upon the escalation of the crisis and the AKP government’s accusations of the
Assad regime’s massacre of the opposition, bilateral relations that had once
been very close collapsed altogether. During this period, Erdog˘an stated that
Turkey is ready to ask NATO for military intervention in Syria. In addition,
following the deaths of Turkish citizens as a result of clashes between Assad
forces and opposition groups, the Turkish parliament approved a resolution
authorizing the Turkish military to cross into Syria. Furthermore, Turkey’s
worsening relations with the Assad regime also affected its relations with the
governments of Iraq and Iran. Following Turkey’s NATO request for Patriot
missiles to protect against the potential aggression of the Assad government,
Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hasan Firuzabadi suggested that the
Patriot missile system’s deployment in Turkey might trigger the possibility of
a new world war.3 Iraqi Premier Nouri Maliki also strongly criticized Turkey’s
Syria policy and accused Turkey of trying to draw NATO forces into the
Syrian conflict just to defend Turkey when, in fact, there was no threat to
defend Turkey against.4
Building on these recent developments, one can ask the question why
Turkey’s new activist foreign policy lost its footing so quickly in the Middle East
and why Turkey’s ‘kingmaker’ image was toppled by its own Syria policy. This
study aims to explore the changing foreign policy approach of Turkey towards
the Middle East after the ‘Arab Spring’ spread to Syria. In doing so, this paper
first discusses the theoretical framework of Turkey’s Middle East policy before
and after the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria. The theoretical comparison of these
periods helps to identify the conditions that led to changes in Turkey’s foreign
policy behaviour. The study then compares these two periods by focusing on
Turkey’s approaches towards the conflicts in the Middle East in order to test
whether these conditions have changed.
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Understanding Turkey’s regional activism in the Middle East
While Ankara’s regional activism is clearly evident under the three successive
AKP governments (2002–present), different approaches are suggested to explain
this increasing role of Turkey as a major foreign policy actor in the Middle East.
These explanations, however, are largely anecdotal and as such are not grounded
in any theoretical framework with explicit assumptions regarding the link
between conditions and behaviour. This article attempts to fill that void by
engaging several theoretical frameworks offered in the discipline of International
Relations (IR) in order to understand how Turkish foreign policy’s paradigm
changed after ‘Arab Spring’. The following section identifies potential
explanations derived from three branches of IR theory: structural realism,
constructivism and rational choice theory.
Structural realism: systemic factors and the shifts in hegemonic behaviour
Explanations derived from structural realism might suggest that Turkey’s
increased activism in the Middle East is due to conditions arising from the 9/11
terrorist attacks including the subsequent declaration of the Bush doctrine.
According to such a deterministic explanation, the structure of the international
system constrains the formulation of policy by state leaders, irrespective of their
personal intellects and domestic ideologies in the realm of foreign policy. Thus,
there is a causal mechanism between the changing Middle East policy of the US,
which is the hegemonic state in the international system, and Turkey’s regional
activism.
According to Keyman, Turkey’s regional engagement is a logical
consequence of the changing global environment of the post-9/11 era. He argues
that novel elements in global turmoil load new burdens on the shoulders of
Turkey, thus requiring Turkey to increase its presence in various issue areas.
Becoming involved in the complex issues of the Middle East is one of these new
burdens. Therefore, Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy towards the Middle East
is Turkey’s response to the realities of the existing international system.5
Altunıs¸ık and Martin also highlight the influence of structural factors in
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, arguing that the US invasion
of Iraq changed the structure of the Middle East’s regional politics. This
structural change created opportunities and incentives for Turkey to play a
more active role in the Middle East. Accordingly, the threat of transnational
Kurdish nationalism stemming from a highly unstable post-Saddam Iraq
produced a realignment of relations among Turkey, Iran and Syria. On the
other hand, with Iraq effectively removed as a potential regional player, the
Gulf States regarded Turkey as a counter-balance to Iran.6 In the final analysis,
it was the change in US policy towards the Middle East in the aftermath of the
11 September 2001 attacks that paved the way for Turkey to have closer ties
with Middle Eastern states, rather than Turkey’s own incentives, capabilities
and leadership.
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Constructivism: Islamic identity
Those applying a constructivist approach to explain the shifts in Turkey’s foreign
policy would point to the influence of identity factors, which can serve to
prescribe particular appropriate forms of behaviour and alliances for a state with a
particular identity. In the Turkish case, critics of the AKP underline the influence
of the Islamist background of the party elite and particularly their past
involvement in explicitly politically Islamist parties over Turkish foreign policy.
In a strategic move, AKP elites departed from the anti-Western and radical
discourse of political Islam after 28 February 1997 when the Turkish military’s
ultimatum forced the government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to
resign. Although Erbakan insisted on defending the political ideas and rhetoric of
Islamism, the younger generation of his Welfare Party – including Erdog˘an,
Abdullah Gu¨l and Bu¨lent Arınc – formed the AKP and portrayed themselves as
strong advocates of democracy, civilian control of the military, the EU
membership process and a free market economy. This remarkable ‘U-turn’ for
these figures was not without reason. According to Tibi, the AKP’s commitment
to the EU and democracy is the product of its instrumental concerns rather than a
philosophical alignment.7 AKP elites were aware that democracy could limit the
influence of the military over the political system and, given their experience with
the military in the past, aimed to ease the military out of politics. Critics of the
AKP’s foreign policy also argue that its pro-Western discourse is pragmatic since
it aims to avert the pressure of the army, which regards itself as the guardian of
the secular Republic. Whatever the motivations behind the AKP’s moderation of
its political approach, the party undeniably has Islamist roots and, according to a
constructivist explanation of Turkey’s foreign policy shift, these roots influence
Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East. From this perspective, the AKP
government’s Islamist identity and its prescription of closer ties with fellow
Muslim states determines Turkey’s regional activism rather than national
interests defined purely in materialist terms.8 This constructivist approach,
therefore, explains Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour towards the Middle East by
focusing on the identity composition of AKP elites.
Rational choice theory: maximizing gains in a multi-dimensional environment
According to a rational choice argument, the AKP pursues a multi-dimensional
foreign policy and successfully links its increasing influence in the Middle East in
order to bolster its position in the West. Intellectual circles supporting the AKP’s
foreign policy framework, for instance, highlight the importance of
interconnectedness between Turkey and its Eastern neighbours. From this
perspective, Turkey has left behind the geo-political alignments of the Cold War,
which had required it to be committed to the Western security system while
neglecting other foreign policy opportunities. By the time the AKP took office,
however, this picture had changed and Turkey placed ‘all foreign policy areas
and issues into a single picture of policy formulation’.9 The scope of Turkish
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foreign policy has thus both broadened and gained momentum, particularly in the
Middle East.
Ahmet Davutog˘lu, the architect of AKP’s foreign policy, defines the
rationality of Turkey’s engagement in the Middle East by employing a ‘bow and
arrow’ analogy. The ‘bow and arrow’ analogy, defining Turkey as an archer,
implies that the more Turkey draws the string of the bow through the East, the
farther the arrow flies West.10 The main implication of this analogy is the
interconnectedness between Turkey’s policy towards the West and the Middle
East. Turkey’s ultimate goal is to be a regular member of the Western state
system.11 Thus, Turkey’s regional activism could be leverage for its
Westernization process. In other words, Turkey’s contributions to the Western
security architecture by being involved in the complexities of the Middle East
might facilitate its relations with the Western states.12
This approach regards the rationality of Turkey’s decision-making
mechanism as the key factor of it foreign policy. Accordingly, Turkey’s
engagement in the Middle East is not dictated by structural changes and identity
obsessions, but is the deliberate consequence of the ruling elite’s rational choices.
Rather than fully ignoring the cultural-historical and ideational ties between
Turkey and the Middle East as more ascetic rational choice approaches might do,
in Davutog˘lu’s strategic depth proposition such ties are featured as elements of a
country’s power. In addition to material power potential, social identity is
regarded as leverage that increases the power capabilities of a country.13 The role
attributed to social identities is thus pragmatic; identities are viewed as tools
serving the national interest of a country. According to Davutog˘lu, as the
crossroads of a European identity and Eastern identities – including Middle
Eastern, Central Asian and Caucasian – Turkey is a unique case in terms of
identity. In benefiting from this unique position, Turkey has the ability to pursue a
multi-dimensional foreign policy in both the West and the East.14
Reviewing Turkey’s Middle East policy under AKP governments from
different theoretical perspectives helps us to understand the factors that each of
these explanations take into account – and those which they do not. This review
makes clear, for example, that none of the above-mentioned explanations factors
in the role of foreign military interventions of the Western states in the Middle
East. These explanations assume that the Middle East and the West are separate
regions and there is no conflictual relationship between them. That is to say, they
do not address Turkey’s standpoint during times when Western states use hard
power and violate the sovereignty of the Middle Eastern states.
This article therefore argues that without examining Turkey’s policy towards
the conflicts between the Middle East and the West, a full understanding of
Turkey’s shifts in foreign policy is not possible. In particular, this paper examines
the case of whether and how the ‘Arab Spring’ changed Turkey’s foreign policy
behaviour towards the Middle East. As noted previously, until the ‘Arab Spring’
reached Syria, Turkey was expected to be the kingmaker of the Middle East by
employing a foreign policy based on instruments of soft power. However,
B.B. O¨zpek and Y. Demirag˘332
Turkey’s policy has changed and its Middle Eastern neighbours have accused
Turkey of exaggerating the Syrian crisis in order to use its military power by
drawing NATO forces into the Syrian conflict. In sum, a new, more
comprehensive theoretical approach is required to explain Turkey’s policy
shift following the ‘Arab Spring’.
From agenda-setter state to agenda-enterpreneur state
It is arguable that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has changed
since the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria. Furthermore, such transformation
indicates that existing approaches, attempting to explain Turkish foreign policy
during the AKP governments, fail to acknowledge the importance of
international regimes and Turkey’s tendency to set agendas during and after
conflict processes. This paper demonstrates that Turkey’s shifting policy toward
the Middle East can be understood by analysing the changing nature of the
relationship between Turkey and international regimes, especially when the
Middle East experiences foreign interventions.
The behavioural pattern of AKP governments before the ‘Arab Spring’ can be
expressed with the help of the complex interdependence theory developed by
Keohane and Nye, with which students of International Relations are quite
familiar. According to these scholars, realist literature explains states’ behaviour
based on their power-seeking and interest-maximizing nature and inadequately
acknowledges the role of international organizations. While the pursuit of
security serves as the primary determinant of international relations in early
realist literature, world developments contributed to the erosion of inter-agenda
hierarchies and the rise of an increasingly diverse set of issues. The need to
resolve novel problems linked to these emerging issues, in turn, boosted the need
for international organizations. Moreover, international organizations paved the
way for new political agendas and greater influence for smaller governments.
In this context, weaker states were able to link certain issues with their individual
political agendas, thus attaining greater political bargaining power, while also
making use of single-vote systems to safeguard their interests against states with
greater material power by building coalitions within international organizations
established around certain issues.15
In line with Keohane and Nye’s theoretical framework, the AKP era of
Turkish foreign policy attempted to deal with the interventions in countries in the
Middle East region through international regimes, due to a lack of sufficient
material power to prevent such processes unilaterally. This effort stemmed from
the concern that Turkey would be excluded from agendas that emerged after
unilateral interventions and therefore be deprived of its influence over future,
potentially very complex, developments. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s
participation in the Afghanistan and Libya operations as part of NATO forces
and its initiation of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Platform following the
2003 US invasion of Iraq were the product of Turkey’s need to intervene in
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ongoing processes via international organizations and platforms. Furthermore,
Turkey’s participation in such multilateral fora on non-military issues as well as
issues regarding present and post-conflict scenarios may also be accounted for
with reference to the argument that international organizations may assist in
bridging different agendas.
On the other hand, this neoliberalist approach focusing on institutional
cooperation cannot explain Turkey’s Middle East policy following the diffusion
of the ‘Arab Spring’. Prior to this regional transformation, Turkey had rejected
any combatant role in the foreign interventions in the Middle East and aimed to
exert influence over conflicts via the use of international platforms and a soft
power agenda. In doing so, Turkey used a strategy of issue linkage, which refers
to attempts to affect a specfic agenda by using other issue areas. In this period, the
use of non-military issues in order to shape these intervention processes
characterized Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey’s behaviour deviated
from this pattern following the Syrian conflict. Instead of shaping an already-
existing agenda, Turkey formulated its own agenda based on military solutions
for the Syria crisis and aimed to mobilize NATO members to intervene.
In explaining the motives behind Turkey’s changing policy I˙diz offers a
somewhat constructivist explanation, arguing that Turkey’s approach towards the
‘Arab Spring’ has been shaped by the fact that Sunni oppostion under the
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has become the winner of this process.
After the fall of formerly entrenched regimes, there has been increasing cross-
border cooperation between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to
power in Tunisia and Egypt. Furthermore, such cooperation is more visible with
Sunni groups like Hamas and the Syrian opposition than Shiite groups such as
Hezbollah and the Shiite opposition in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.16 In so doing, it
could be argued that the AKP government aims to exploit the post-Assad period
by maintaining this cooperation. This is to say, Turkey’s changing Middle East
policy expects that the downfall of Assad might create an axis of the regimes that
are in an ideological solidarity with Turkey.
This new policy of exploitation-via-cooperation is better explained by realist
theories, which regard international organizations as a tool for power and security
maximization rather than independent actors changing the interest calculations of
states. In other words, Turkey’s new Middle East policy seems to be based on
using the military capacity of NATO and the United States in order to consolidate
its kingmaker position in the Middle East while its previous policy was grounded
in utilizing instrunments of soft power to influence conflict and post-conflict
processes produced by the military agression of these actors.
Regional activism’s trial with foreign interventions
During the period between 2002, when the AKP took the office, and 2011, when
Turkey’s Middle East policy changed following the spread of the Arab upheavals
to Syria, three military interventions occurred in the Middle East. These are
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NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Libya in 2002 and 2011 and the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003. These conflicts should be examined in order to make a
comparative analysis between Turkey’s position during these crises and its policy
towards Syria after the ‘Arab Spring’.
NATO–Afghanistan–Turkey
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 in
which over 3000 people lost their lives, Afghanistan became the United States’
primary military target. President George W. Bush’s address in the attacks’
immediate aftermath declared that evidence linked the attacks to Osama bin
Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist organization, and ordered all terrorists to be
captured dead or alive. The US government demanded that Afghanistan’s
Taliban regime turn over Bin Laden, who was charged with orchestrating the
9/11 attacks, but the regime refused to honour that request despite lengthy
negotiations. The Taliban’s negative response to the US marked the beginning of
an anticipated attack.
Following these developments, the Turkish government announced that it
would offer unconditional support to any US military operation against
Afghanistan. Furthermore, Prime Minister Bu¨lent Ecevit argued that the US must
intervene in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban even if Bin Laden left the country,
as the regime in question was archaic. In addition, Turkey sent a letter to the US
administration informing it of the availability of Turkish airports for use in case
of an operation. Once again, Ecevit noted that Turkey possessed considerable
intelligence data on Afghanistan and emphasized that the country could thus
contribute to a US military operation. However, Turkey did not wish its support
to be seen internationally as an interventionist act.17 President Ahmet Necdet
Sezer framed Turkey’s contributions as an effort to establish a democratic regime
and thereby prevent foreign interventions.18
On the other hand, it would not be incorrect to claim that Turkey’s
Afghanistan policy under the AKP was defined with greater clarity and in
accordance with a ‘soft power’ framework. Turkey contributed approximately
300 servicemen to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO-
associated multinational peace force that was established following American
and British troops’ entry into Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and the Taliban
regime’s overthrow. Turkey was in command of ISAF twice (June 2002–
February 2003 and February 2003–February 2005), increased the number of its
troops by up to 1300 at a time, and took over Kabul Regional Command with
nearly 1800 servicemen for a one-year term from 31 October 2009. It is necessary
to underscore, however, that Turkey – unlike other NATO member countries –
designated all its forces as non-combatant units.
Indeed, Prime Minister Erdog˘an regularly pointed out that Turkey’s military
presence in the region was not geared toward combat and instead played an
important role for training the Afghan state’s security forces, and that these
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efforts were part of longer-term development-oriented investments.19 In this
context, the Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team, stationed 40 km west of
Kabul and led by a civilian diplomat, successfully completed over 200 socio-
cultural projects with help from the Turkish Cooperation Development Agency
(TIKA).
Other statements by Erdog˘an also hinted at the AKP government’s distance
from the NATO operation in Afghanistan and insistence on not designating
Turkish troops as a combatant force. Erdog˘an claimed that military solutions
would fail to address Afghanistan’s pressing problems and argued that the local
population’s sympathy toward Turkish forces stemmed from their close relations
with the locals and their provision of desired services. These statements indicated
that Turkish troops’ assumption of combatant status would undermine Turkey’s
regional influence. For instance, in response to a question regarding the prospects
of Turkey becoming a combatant nation in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Erdog˘an
made the following statement to define Turkish troops’ mission:
We increased the size of our military personnel from 700 to 1,750. Right now, we are
doing all we can there [in Afghanistan]. If you are askingmewhat else is on the table,
we are able to provide training to Afghan security forces. Our military and our police
forces are ready for that. We undertook important efforts in terms of infrastructure.
We have $150 million worth of investments at this time. All these are steps taken to
carry our historical proximity with the Afghan people into the future.20
NATO–Libya–Turkey
The NATO intervention in Libya, which was a smaller-scale repetition of the
military operation in Afghanistan, indicates that the AKP-era Turkish foreign
policy repeats itself in line with a certain model. In the face of resistance
movements that began in Benghazi and later expanded to Tripoli and Misrata, the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) first adopted on 27 February 2011 its
Resolution 1970 proposing an embargo against Libya, and then formulated
Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 that established a no-fly zone to prevent the
Qaddafi regime’s continued attacks against the opposition. This resolution
outlawed all flights in Libyan airspace except for humanitarian aid and froze all
assets belonging to the Libyan National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Central
Bank. The UNSC also mandated member states to take all measures, unilaterally
or through regional organizations, to protect civilians against attacks perpetrated
by the Qaddafi forces. In other words, the resolution paved the way for an
international military intervention to stop Qaddafi.21
The operation initiated by the Americans, French and British (also known as
the ‘Paris Coalition’) on 18 March amidst continual news of violent conflict from
the region despite the UN resolution was transferred to NATO command on
29 March.22 However, adopting a clear stance vis-a`-vis the domestic struggle in
Libya that began in February and eventually triggered international military
intervention proved to be difficult for Turkey. When developments in Libya were
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met with strong reactions from the international community and talk of a possible
NATO intervention became more widely aired, Prime Minister Erdog˘an
questioned on 28 February what NATO was to do in Libya, stating on 14 March
that NATO’s military intervention in the country would be to no avail and
possibly even lead to more dangerous consequences.23 Nevertheless, the French
and British governments’ hasty and enthusiastic proposition to act on the UNSC’s
17 March resolution made it necessary for Turkey to reconsider its stance. This
necessity became more obvious when Turkey was not invited to a meeting held in
Paris to discuss how Resolution 1973 would be enforced. Turkey thus revised
Erdog˘an’s previous statements and advocated the view that a likely intervention
in Libya would operate within the NATO framework.24 This move aimed to
integrate the country into the military planning process.
However, Turkey also made clear that its support for the NATO operation in
Libya was not unrestricted. These reservations were rooted, as in Afghanistan, in
the Turkish government’s unwillingness to be perceived as a foreign occupation
force and a foreign combatant nation. In this context, the country demanded that
the operation was not geared toward the invasion of Libya and that land operation
was not on the table. In addition, Turkey pushed for a resolution that would
provide Libyans with the ownership of the country’s natural resources and
develop steps that would only minimally affect the local population. In this sense,
Erdog˘an declared that his government did not intend to fight or bomb the Libyan
people and would withdraw from the country as quickly as possible. He also
pointed out that Turkey was ready to take over the port of Benghazi as well as the
local airport – both under the rebels’ control – in order to facilitate the
transportation of humanitarian aid and to make clear that Turkey’s military
presence was strictly non-combatant.25
US–Iraq–Turkey
Turkey’s AKP-era regional activism policy experienced one other external
intervention. However, unlike the Afghanistan and Libya operations, the US
military operation against Iraq in 2003 took place in the absence of an
international organization such as NATO, in which Turkey is a member state.
Developing a comprehensive understanding of the difference in these cases will
reveal whether or not Turkish foreign policy remains consistent in the face of
foreign interventions in areas where Turkey practises activism.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government’s counter-terrorism
agenda shifted its focus to Iraq after Afghanistan, and a US-led coalition force
initiated the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Prior to the invasion, US demands
for Turkey to participate in the operation were rendered inconclusive as the
Turkish parliament resisted being part of the invasion on 1 March 2003. In this
new period, Turkey focused its foreign policy instruments on the ‘Neighbouring
Countries of Iraq Platform’ initiative that was intended to make room for Turkey
in Iraq’s reconstruction process.
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The Neighbouring Countries of Iraq initiative’s primary goal was to
safeguard the country’s territorial integrity. The Platform initially rose to
prominence in January 2003 with the help of steps taken by Turkey.26 In this
period, the aim was to prevent an American invasion of Iraq to topple the Saddam
Hussein regime, and to develop a peaceful solution through diplomatic means.
Despite the United States’ initial opposition to the initiative due to the Bush
administration’s decisively pro-invasion stance, the first meeting to begin the
process took place on 23 January 2003 in Istanbul at the foreign minister-level.
Representatives from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Syria attended this
summit. A series of meetings took place in Cairo the following year and
continued in later years, including a 2006 Tehran meeting in which then-Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gu¨l was among the participants. Although the US government
reacted negatively to Turkey joining countries such as Iran and Syria in this kind
of setting, it later warmed to the Neighbours of Iraq Platform, as the security
deficit in Iraq worsened and the invasion led to unanticipated consequences.
In this sense, the ambassador-level meeting that took place in Baghdad on
10 March 2007 was a turning point, as this was the first time that the United
States, Iran and Syria had met together in quite a while.27 Aside from Iraq’s
neighbouring countries, the UNSC’s five permanent members and representa-
tives from the G-8 countries were also in attendance at the meeting. The United
States’ participation in the Baghdad summit led to discussions of whether the
country’s Iraq strategy was shifting from war to diplomacy.
Over time, the meetings became an important venue for the resolution of the
Iraq issue, in which regional countries voiced their support for the country’s
territorial integrity, political unity as well as the ongoing political process and the
government in Iraq. In its new form, the Extended Neighbouring Countries of
Iraq initiative’s first meeting was held at the foreign minister-level in the
Egyptian city of Sharm el Sheikh in May 2007.28 This summit led to a resolution
to speed up the establishment of three working groups regarding security and
border safety cooperation, aid for Iraqi refugees, and Iraq’s energy and electricity
needs. The second meeting of the Extended Neighbouring Countries of Iraq
initiative took place in Istanbul in November 2007.29 High-level representatives
from Turkey, Iraq, Bahrain, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Great Britain attended this
meeting along with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon.30
American, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers sharing a table during the
luncheon before the meeting’s initiation with PM Erdog˘an’s opening speech
attracted worldwide media attention.31 Observers also regarded it a historical
development that Rice, who had not attended the Sharm el Sheikh summit’s
working luncheon due to tensions with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr
Mottaki, joined Iranian and Iraqi representatives under Turkey’s auspices.32
This picture shows that there was indeed consistency in Turkey’s behaviour
when the Middle East experienced foreign military interventions. As discussed
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previously, Turkey’s regional activism was based on non-military means such as
diplomacy and development, while external interventions used instruments of
hard power. Such a discrepancy inevitably created challenges for Turkey’s
Middle East policy. Turkey did not have sufficient power to prevent such
interventions, as the US invasion of Iraq and the NATO operation in Libya cases
showed. Furthermore, its membership in NATO compelled Turkey to be a part of
such interventions, as seen in the cases of Afghanistan and Libya. Nevertheless,
Turkey could find a third way between non-intervention, which could undermine
Turkey’s relations with Western states, and military engagement, which could
weaken Turkey’s regional activism policy.
The first principle of Turkey’s policy is ‘non-military engagement’, which
refers to engagement based on humanitarian and development issues. For
example, although Turkey joined NATO forces in operations in Afghanistan and
Libya, Turkish political elites highlighted Turkey’s non-combatant role and
underscored Turkey’s contribution to the post-conflict development. The second
principle involves the use of international organizations and platforms as a tool to
mould the agenda of external intervention. While Turkey’s membership in
NATO enabled Turkey to set and shape the agenda in Afghanistan and Libya, its
attempts to form the ‘Neighbouring Countries of Iraq’ platform aimed to
influence the agenda of the US in the post-conflict process. These behavioural
patterns shifted dramatically after the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria, as is
demonstrated below.
Turkey and Syria
Lessons learned from the above discussion will be apllied here to provide a better
explanation for Turkey’s shift in foreign policy following the spread of the ‘Arab
Spring’ to Syria. The ‘Arab Spring’ that arose out of popular demonstrations for
democracy and freedom in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya spread to affect Syria from
March 2011 onward. New developments in Syria left Turkey in a dilemma
regarding its relations with Bashar Assad and initiated a tense period in bilateral
relations.33 Despite having promised to introduce democratic reforms, anti-
corruption measures and precautions to safeguard and develop human rights in
the country, Assad failed to provide a political solution that satisfied the Syrian
opposition. As a result of this failure, the revolutionary movement has turned into
a civil war, becoming internationalized and thereby affecting Turkish–Syrian
relations.
In his August 2011 meeting with Foreign Minister Davutog˘lu, Assad stated
that he would ‘not give up on his struggle against terrorists’.34 Rapidly
deteriorating bilateral relations worsened in April 2012 as Assad forces’ attacks
against opponents escaping toward the Turkish border injured a Turkish citizen.35
The Turkish government issued a diplomatic note to Syria following the Houla
Massacre of 25 May 2012 to announce that it was suspending all diplomatic
relations and resolved to deport all Syrian diplomatic personnel.36 However, the
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most notable breaking point in Turkish–Syrian relations was Syria’s downing of
a Turkish F-4 Phantom fighter jet during a training flight on 22 June 2012.37 In his
statement following the incident, Erdog˘an declared that the conflict had entered a
new stage in which Syria represented ‘a clear and proximate threat’ to Turkey’s
security. Erdog˘an also stated that
We will employ our rights under international law and take necessary steps. A new
stage began with the most recent incident. Turkey will not tolerate the security risks
that Syria presents at our borders and will not leave these unanswered. We have
therefore altered the Turkish Armed Forces’ rules of engagement in line with this
new stage.38
In official protest against the Syrian government, Turkey also called for a
meeting of NATO members. The summit at the organization’s headquarters in
Brussels resulted in NATO support for Turkey and a condemnation of the Syrian
government.39 In his first statement regarding the fighter jet-downing incident, on
3 July 2012 Assad announced that Syria had hit the jet with anti-aircraft battery
without knowing its Turkish origin and expressed his regret for the incident. Once
pieces of the aircraft and the pilots’ bodies were recovered, Turkey stationed
troops from its 6th Army Command near the Syrian border and equipped these
with anti-aircraft artillery. At the same time, Ankara assigned Gaziantep Airport
military status in order to station missile ramps at this facility. Furthermore, the
4th Artillery Battalion originally stationed in S¸anlıurfa was repositioned by the
border.
A new crisis followed as Syrian artillery fire hit Akcakale, S¸anlıurfa and
claimed the lives of five Turkish civilians. Following the incident, Turkey took a
notable step against Syria by firing warning shots against its neighbour and
killing 34 Syrian military personnel.40 Artillery fire against Akcakale and
Turkey’s subsequent response received worldwide media coverage, with many
media outlets describing the event as ‘the most serious escalation’ since the
Syrian civil war’s outbreak. A New York Times story entitled ‘Turkey Strikes
Back After Syrian Shelling Kills 5 Civilians’ noted that the Turkish government
made ‘a move that increases the risk of escalating the bloody civil war into a
regional conflict’ and underlined that the Akcakale affair could pressure the West
into military intervention.41 Similarly, the Wall Street Journal maintained that
Turkey was the first country to hit Syria since the beginning of the civil war and
pointed out that the retaliation marked ‘the first time Turkey has shelled a foreign
states’ armed forces since its incursion into Cyprus’.42
A NATO summit at the ambassadorial level convened following the incident
and condemned the Syrian government for its actions.43 In his address to the
Turkish parliament following the attack on Akcakale that resulted in five
casualties, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutog˘lu stated that the legislative body’s
approval of the government’s mandate for military involvement in Syria ‘made a
warning to the Syrian government’.44 Damascus, on the other hand, issued an
apology and offered its condolences for civilian losses that resulted from the
incident. On 10 October, Turkey forced a Syrian A-320 passenger plane to land at
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Ankara airport, rekindling tensions between the two countries.45 The Turkish
government also issued a diplomatic note to the Syrian consulate in Istanbul
citing ‘a violation of civil aviation guidelines’. Mahmoud Said, the Syrian
minister of transport, described the forced landing as ‘piracy’.46 Prime Minister
Erdog˘an, however, declared that the Syrian aircraft’s cargo included
ammunition.47
By this point, Turkey had assumed a clearly anti-Assad and pro-opposition
stance and called upon NATO members for support, citing Syria’s potential
threat and use of chemical weapons. Consequently, the organization resolved to
station Patriot missiles on Turkish soil for defensive purposes.48 This step not
only put an end to Turkey’s isolation but also ensured NATO involvement in the
affair. As such, any future hostility towards Turkey would also concern other
NATO members. In the face of criticism from domestic opposition and foreign
governments such as Iran and Russia, Prime Minister Erdog˘an defended
Ankara’s request for Patriot missiles as ‘an entirely defensive, precautionary
measure . . . to protect our people and boost [our] deterrence [capacity]’ and
therefore ruled out the missiles’ aggressive use.49
Against the background of Turkey’s ongoing search for an appropriate
location to station NATO’s Patriot missiles against potential threats from Syria,
the government also conducted bilateral negotiations with the United States for
another missile defence system. Ankara intended to obtain Terminal High
Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missiles that would offer a more advanced
complementary element to the Patriot Air Defence Missile System. To this end,
the United States government offered to temporarily loan one of the THAAD
missiles to Turkey.50 Turkish fighter jets conducted armed flights over the border
region for the first time following Syria’s aerial bombardment of Rasulayn, a
Syrian town across the border from Ceylanpınar, S¸anlıurfa. Military sources
indicated that Turkish fighter jets conducted armed flights for the first time and
right on the border – as opposed to earlier cases where they handled discovery
and reconnaissance missions further away from the border.51
Upon these developments, Syria, Iran and Iraq reacted strongly to Turkey’s
request from NATO to station Patriot missiles along its southern border. The
Syrian government condemned the step as ‘a new provocation’.52 The deputy
foreign minister of Syria, Faisal al-Mikdad, claimed that Turkey had gone
bankrupt and therefore begged NATO countries for help. He also accused the
Turkish government of financing and training terrorists as well as facilitating al-
Qaida members’ entry into Syrian territory.53
Iran became the country most critical of Turkey’s request. General Seyed
Hassan Firuzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, claimed that the
Patriot missiles’ stationing in Turkey was an effort to protect Israel and
demanded that Ankara return the missiles before the situation escalated into a
full-blown war, warning that the missiles could lead to World War III.54
Similarly, Iranian Minister of Defence Ahmad Vahidi commented that NATO
missiles would only harm Turkey and suggested that the country ‘jeopardized its
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own security by stationing Patriot missiles in its territory’.55 In addition to these
statements, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei’s chief military advisor General Yadullah
Javani maintained that Turkey’s decision to station Patriot missiles was a
strategic mistake and warned that ‘Ankara shall pay a greater price than before
and experience more harm if the Patriots are a prelude to a military intervention
in Syria’.56
On the other hand, Iraqi Premier Maliki regarded Turkey’s policy towards
Syria as a threat to regional stability. He posited that Iraq is against NATO
intervention in Syria on the grouds of defending Turkey as Turkey is not under a
threat from Syria and because NATO intervention might precipitate a regional
war. According to Maliki, Turkey aims to impose its foreign policy agenda on
Syria by dragging NATO into conflict. In regard to Turkey’s Iraq policy,57 Maliki
also accused Turkey of being a hostile state interfering in the internal affairs of
Iraq and of supporting sectarianism in order to consolidate its regional hegemony
in the Middle East.58
Building on this discussion of Turkey’s relations with Syria after the ‘Arab
Spring’, it becomes clear that the terms ‘security’, ‘threat’ and ‘use of force’
dominate the foreign policy agenda. Unlike the period of regional activism that
characterized the AKP’s Middle East policy until the ‘Arab Spring’ affected Syria,
Turkey has become inclined to use hard power instruments instead of economic
and diplomatic engagement. Furthermore, Turkey enthusiastically supports NATO
involvement in the Syria crisis while it had rejected being a combatant force in
operations in Afghanistan and Libya. As the statements of the Syrian, Iraqi and
Iranian officials show, these governments regard Turkey as an ‘opportunity seeker’
looking for a military intervention in Syria in order to topple the Assad regime. In
addition, it would not be wrong to argue that these governments want to explore the
anti-Western sentiments of Middle Eastern public opinion by accusing Turkey of
facilitating NATO invasion in the Middle East.
This picture implies that Turkey’s Middle East policy has dramatically
changed since the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria. Prior to the ‘Arab Spring’,
Turkey was reluctant to concede to foreign military interventions that could
impede Turkey’s policy of cultivating bilateral and inter-governmental relations
based on non-military instruments in the Middle East. Since Turkey did not have
sufficient power to prevent such interventions, however, it attempted to set and
shape the post-conflict agenda by using international organizations and related
platforms. However, since the Syria crisis, Turkey has discarded the Assad
regime in favour of supporting the opposition. Furthermore, Turkey urged
international organizations like NATO to support its agenda by using instruments
of hard power if necessary.
From reluctance to enthusiasm
When the AKP came to power in 2002, the political Islamist background of the
party elite raised questions regarding the future of secularism and the Western
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orientation of Turkey. Unlike previous political Islamist parties, however, the
AKP did not articulate a specific Islam-based identity definition for Turkey.
During the first years of the AKP governments, the European Union accession
process gained momentum and the democratic reform process continued. In
addition to seeking EU membership, Turkey pursued an active agenda in the
Middle East as well. Supporters of the AKP’s foreign policy argued that Turkey
had discovered its multi-dimensionality principle. Accordingly, Turkey started to
behave like a rational actor free from any constraining identity commitments.
However, as the AKP consolidated its power in the Turkish political system,
this picture has gradually disappeared. With the help of EU reforms and the EU’s
political support, the Turkish military’s influence on the political stage has
decreased. However, such a transformation did not ensure a successful EU
accession process. Instead, Turkey’s ambitious agenda to make progress in the
accession process has lost ground and the 2012 EU Progress Report criticized
problems related to freedom of expression and the media in Turkey. That is not to
say that the AKP has been the only party in the accession process to lose its
enthusiasm after eliminating the military’s influence over politics. The EU
commitment to Turkey’s accession also seems to have weakened due to the
economic crisis and the exclusionist political attitudes of some member countries
such as France and Germany. In sum, the major pillar of the AKP’s multi-
dimensional foreign policy doctrine has thus lapsed into silence.
On the other hand, Turkey’s rising activism was based on a holistic approach
that regards the region as a whole. During the first AKP term (2002–07) Turkey
pursued a Middle East policy based on an ‘equal distance’ principle. This meant
that Turkey did not exclude any actor in the Middle East and demonstrated that it
was in favour of the status quo in the Middle East with its policy towards foreign
military interventions threatening stability in the region. In this period, Turkey
did not join the combatant forces of foreign interventions, choosing to pursue
agenda-setting strategies in order to influence the (post-)intervention process
through soft power instruments and collaboration within international regimes.
Moreover, Turkey gained the initiative to solve regional conflicts such as the
Israel–Syria conflict by the means of its status as a ‘moderator state’, a status that
resulted as from the ‘equal distance’ policy.
Despite having achieved this status, Turkey has gradually abandoned its
holistic approach and activism strategies. It could thus be argued that the second
pillar of its multi-dimensional foreign policy has lost ground as well. The first
contraction of Turkey’s role in the Middle East was the exclusion of Israel from
Turkey’s Middle East definition, initiated by AKP elites’ criticism of the Israel
government’s behaviour during the Gaza War between Israel and Hamas in
December 2008 and furthered as a result of the Davos Summit crisis between
Erdog˘an and Israeli President Shimon Perez in 2009. The Mavi Marmara
(flotilla) incident in 2010 exacerbated tensions to the point where the potential for
reconciliation between the countries was questioned. The second shrinkage
followed the spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ to Syria, as Turkey’s support for Sunni
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opposition groups in Syria frustrated Shiite governments such as Iraq and Iran
and Shiite populations of the Middle East. Turkey can thus be viewed as having
narrowed its Middle East understanding into Sunni groups.
In addition to a reduction in the actors with which it attempts to engage on a
productive basis, Turkey has also altered the strategies by which it engages in the
region. As demonstrated above, AKP governments had eschewed using hard
power as a foreign policy instrument before the ‘Arab Spring’ threatened the
Assad regime in Syria. During that period economic engagement, diplomacy, soft
power and international organizations characterized Turkey’s Middle East
policy. As noted previously, it was not uncommon to assume that Turkey’s policy
formulation was regarded as a successful example of multi-dimensionality by
many scholars. Accordingly, the foreign policy-making elite of the AKP
managed to interconnect Turkey’s interests in the Middle East with its Western
orientation. Although this multi-dimensional foreign policy had been challenged
by foreign military interventions in the Middle East, Turkey did not join
combatant forces and used international organizations and non-military agendas
to affect the post-intervention process.
However, the diffusion of the ‘Arab Spring’ to Syria altered the AKP’s
longstanding foreign policy approach. Instead of preserving the status quo,
Turkey has turned into a revisionist state that has begun to threaten Middle
Eastern governments. While Turkey was reluctant to join the foreign military
interventions aimed at Middle Eastern regimes, it has behaved enthusiastically in
bringing NATO forces into the Syrian civil conflict catalysed by the ‘Arab
Spring’. Such transformation ultimately undermines analyses that define Turkey
as the kingmaker of the Middle East. Turkey’s new foreign policy now seems
potentially successful only if NATO countries are convinced to adopt offensive
strategies against the Assad regime. The AKP’s new Middle East policy thus
seems to make Turkey dependent on the mercy of NATO countries for military
intervention and the reconstruction of a post-‘Arab Spring’ Middle East. Given
this context, students of Turkish foreign policy are likely to be reading fewer
articles defining Turkey as the ‘kingmaker’ of the Middle East in the future.
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